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Abstract
In this paper we show experimentally that in a sequential auction the presence of
synergies leads to more overbidding which in turn may result in bankruptcies. In line
with theoretical predictions we find that the seller benefits from the buyers’ synergies.
In contrast to theory the buyers also benefit from these synergies. Moreover, opposed to
theory and many empirical findings we do not observe declining prices. Finally we find
that the overbidding is increasing in the valuation of the object on which the synergy does
not materialize and we attribute this finding to anchoring.
JEL Classification: C91, D44.
Keywords: Bankruptcy, Experiment, Sequential Auction, Synergies.
1 Introduction
A distinguishing characteristic of procurement auctions is their sequential nature. Construc-
tion contracts, military procurement, and the uncoordinated sequence of European spectrum
auctions during 2000 and 2001 are all examples of this sequentiality (Reiß and Schöndube,
2002). Furthermore, large-scale projects are often divided into small subprojects which are
then procured sequentially. This can be the consequence of the complexity of the project
or the fact that too few firms have sufficient resources to complete the project as a whole
(Yildirim, 2004).
In multi-unit procurement auctions winning multiple contracts can lead to cost advantages
due to synergies. These synergies can be material, for instance owning specialized equipment,
or intangible, like expertise. A consequence for the settings above is that bidders’ valuations
are stochastically dependent across auctions. Bidders then face an exposure problem as they
can end up winning contracts that are too expensive if the complementary contracts are not
also won.
∗We would like to thank Martin Strobel, Jan Potters and the conference and seminar participants in
Amsterdam (EARIE 2006) and Maastricht for helpful comments and suggestions. Financial support by the
Dutch Science Foundation (NWO) is gratefully acknowledged.
†Department of Economics, Maastricht University, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands.
Email: {K.Leufkens, R.Peeters, M.Vorsatz}@algec.unimaas.nl. The first author is the corresponding author.
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Also auctions of collectibles exhibit exposure problems. Suppose one is a collector of
paintings from Picasso’s blue period. As the collection of paintings grows, the values of the
missing paintings increase. Imagine having all but one painting, the value of this painting is
now much higher than when one started the collection. With more and more memorabilia
being traded via popular online auction sites, collectors can anticipate that complementarities
for objects auctioned now will become available somewhere in the future.
Much interest in multi-unit auctions was generated by the spectrum auctions that were
conducted all over the world. Typically, exposure problems were present in these auctions
due to synergies. Cramton (2002), for instance, argues that the presence of synergies is one of
the reasons why the revenue from the spectrum auction in the United Kingdom was so high.
In order to get some guidance on which auction rules to implement in the spectrum
auctions and similar complex environments, experimental analyses were conducted. Some of
these experiments explored situations in which theory gave little guidance (Plott, 1997, and
Ledyard et al., 1997) while others tested the feasibility of certain auction mechanisms (Brenner
and Morgan, 1997, and Isaac and James, 2000). Recent experimental research analyzes the
effect the presence of an exposure problem has in simultaneous multi-unit auctions more
thoroughly. Englmaier et al. (2004) compare a chopstick auction to a second-price sealed-bid
auction that does not contain the exposure problem and find that the chopstick auction is
less efficient but yields more revenue. Kagel and Levin (2005) investigate the tension between
demand reduction and positive synergies. They test both uniform-price sealed-bid auctions
and ascending clock auctions and find that bidders are responsive to the underlying forces,
but in the clock auctions there is a general reluctance to overbid when this is optimal.
Surprisingly, few experimental analyses on the exposure problem in sequential auctions
have been conducted. Plott (1997) and Ledyard et al. (1997) report on sequential auction
experiments with the exposure problem. Their focus is on finding the optimal auction mech-
anism and they find that the sequential auction is outperformed by the simultaneous auction
in terms of efficiency and revenue. Février et al. (2004) analyze sequential auctions of two ob-
jects with and without the buyer’s option, which means that the winner of the first object has
the option to also buy the second object at the winning price, and consider settings in which
the valuation for the second object increases if the first is won. Their focus is on comparing
different auction formats in terms of revenue and the usage of the buyer’s option. They note
that subjects bid too conservatively compared to theory which may well be attributed to the
presence of the exposure problem.
The theoretical literature on sequential auctions with synergies focusses mainly on price
trends. Branco (1997) showed that in a sequential auction of homogeneous objects a de-
creasing price trend, better known as the declining price anomaly, can be explained by the
presence of positive synergies. Tang Sørensen (2006) considers a similar model for stochasti-
cally equivalent objects. In both articles synergies are modeled as a positive constant that is
added to the valuation which means that for low valuations the marginal synergy is infinite.
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Jeitschko and Wolfstetter (2002) overcome this problem by modeling synergies as an increase
in the probability of having a high valuation for the second object.
Governments may not only be interested in revenues but also the social consequences
of auction outcomes. Therefore Leufkens et al. (2006) analyze not only price trends and
revenues, but also the consequences the presence of positive synergies has for bidders. They
consider a sequential auction of two stochastically equivalent objects where the valuation of
the second object is uncertain during the first auction and positive synergies are present. It
is found that bidders suffer instead of benefit from the presence of synergies. In contrast to
single private value auctions, it is not guaranteed anymore that in equilibrium bidders do not
make losses which can lead to bankruptcy. Furthermore, it turns out that the expected payoff
for bidders is decreasing in the size of the synergies.
As argued above, many auction settings can be characterized as being sequential in nature
and synergies are often present in such settings. Given these theoretical predictions and
the fact that appropriate field data is impossible to get, an experimental analysis of the
consequences the presence of positive synergies has in a sequential auction can give interesting
insights. Especially the responsiveness of the bidding, and the problem of bankruptcy in
particular, to the presence and the size of the synergy are important for public policy. In
this paper we therefore experimentally analyze a model similar to Leufkens et al. (2006) and
compare a baseline treatment without synergies to two treatments with positive synergies of
different size.
We find that the presence of positive synergies, and thus the exposure problem, indeed
changes the sequential auction fundamentally. The presence of synergies leads to an increase
in the overbidding and the number of round bankruptcies. However, the responsiveness to
an increase in the size of the synergy factor is much smaller than predicted by theory and
bidding does not get as competitive as expected. Consequently, we find that when the possible
synergies are large, bidders do benefit from them. The seller always benefits from the bidders’
synergies but not as much as expected. The price in the first auction of a round does not
increase enough to observe declining prices. Finally, in the two treatments with positive
synergies we find that the overbidding is increasing in the valuation of the object on which
the synergy does not materialize and we attribute this finding to anchoring.
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section the model and its equilibrium are
discussed. Section 3 describes the experimental design and the laboratory procedures. The
hypotheses are given in Section 4 and in Section 5 the results are presented. In Section 6
we discuss some behavioral findings of our experiment. The conclusion can be found in
Section 7. Appendix A contains the instructions and the control questions and Appendix B
the post experimental questionnaire.
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2 The auction setting
We consider a private value auction of two stochastically equivalent objects. The objects
are auctioned sequentially using the second-price sealed-bid format.1 Bidders’ valuations
are uniformly distributed between 0 and 100 and the same four bidders participate in both
auctions. Valuations are individually uncorrelated and drawn independently according to this
distribution. Furthermore, the valuation for the second object is not known during the first
auction. The bid and valuation in auction k of bidder n are denoted by bkn and vkn.
Although no bidder knows his valuation of the second object during the first auction, it is
common knowledge that winning the first object increases this valuation by factor s ≥ 1. If
bidder i then wins the first object, his valuation in the second auction (weakly) increases from
v2i to s v2i, but does not have any effect on v1i. Consequently, winning the first auction leads
to an increase in the expected instantaneous payoff of the second auction. After each auction
bidders are informed whether or not they won the object, the price at which the object was
sold, and their payoff, which is the difference between the valuation and the price when the
auction is won and zero otherwise.
The way in which positive synergies are modeled is comparable to the way Black and De
Meza (1992) model negative synergies. Attributing cost reductions only to the second object
makes sense considering the order in which projects are executed. For instance, expertise is
created during the first project and this gives benefits for the second or specialized equipment
is needed which then does not need to be acquired for a second project. This way of modeling
synergies also ensures that there is a relationship between the increase in valuation due to
synergies and the intrinsic value of the second object. Although the synergy factor is known
a priori, the actual gain due to synergies depends on the realized second auction valuation.
The model resembles Engelbrecht-Wiggans’ (1994) and Tang Sørensen’s (2006) models by
having bidders’ valuations drawn independently across objects and only be known at the start
of each auction. This is applicable when there is a time gap between two following auctions.
Then, the exact valuation of the second object is uncertain at the time of the first auction,
but it is known that a similar project will be auctioned in the future.
The expected instantaneous payoff of auction 1 for bidder i prior to the realization of the
valuations for this auction is denoted by π̄1i. The expected instantaneous payoff of auction
2 for bidder i, π̄2i, is prior to the realization of the valuations for this auction but given the
outcome of the first auction. Finally, p̄k is the expected price of auction k, R̄ is the expected
revenue from both auctions for the seller and µ̄i is the expected payoff from both auctions for
bidder i, and all are prior to the realization of any valuation.
The symmetric equilibrium for four risk-neutral bidders and s ≥ 1 is given below (see
Leufkens et al. (2006)). All hypotheses will be formulated with respect to this risk-neutral
1Although many applications are in procurement settings, we analyze ‘highest bid wins’ auctions for expo-
sitional ease and without loss of generality.
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equilibrium specification.
b∗1i = v1i + (50 s − 75 + 25 1s ) π̄1i = 5 −
1
4 (50 s − 75 + 25
1
s )
b∗2i =
{
v2i if auction 1 is lost
s v2i if auction 1 is won
π̄2i =
{
5 1s if auction 1 is lost
50 s − 75 + 30 1s if auction 1 is won
p̄1 = 60 + (50 s − 75 + 25 1s ) µ̄i = 5 + 5
1
s
p̄2 = 75 − 15 1s R̄ = 50 s + 60 + 10
1
s .
The intuition for the equilibrium bidding strategies is straightforward. The second auction
is a one-shot second-price sealed-bid auction. Consequently everybody will simply bid his
valuation. The gain from winning the first auction is not only the direct payoff from the first
auction, but also the increase in the expected instantaneous payoff of the second auction.
This increase equals the difference between the π̄2i of having won or lost the first auction.
For the remainder of this paper we will refer to this difference as ∆. Since it is a second-price
auction, it is weakly dominant to bid one’s valuation plus ∆ in the first auction.
3 Experimental design and procedures
To analyze the impact the presence of positive synergies has on a sequential auction of two
objects we designed three different treatments. In the baseline treatment, S1.0, there were
no synergies and thus the auctions were independent second-price sealed-bid auctions. In
treatment S1.5 the second auction valuation was multiplied by 1.5 if the first auction was
won. Finally, we had a treatment with even larger synergies, S2.0, where the second auction
valuation was multiplied by 2.0.
Subjects were randomly assigned to groups of four bidders that played the sequential
auction for fifty rounds of two auctions each. It was common knowledge that the group
composition did not change during the experiment, but collusion is not an issue with four
bidders (see Huck et al., 2004). Subjects did not know their second auction valuation during
the first auction. In the two treatments with synergies subjects were informed during each
first auction of a round that the second auction valuation would be upgraded by factor s if
this auction was won. In the second auction the winner of the first auction observed both his
drawn and his upgraded valuation. After an auction each subject received an overview of the
auction outcome; his (upgraded) valuation, the bid submitted, whether or not the auction
was won, the price at which the object was sold and the payoff from the auction. Subjects
never (directly) observed the valuations and bids of others. At the end of each round subjects
also received an update on their total payoff.
Bidders’ valuations were integers from the interval [1,100] and were expressed in Experi-
mental Currency Units (ECU). To maximize the comparability of the treatments, four series
of valuations were fixed and used for all groups of four bidders. In the first and last 25 rounds
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of an experimental session, every integer between 1 and 100 was drawn exactly once in both
auctions. Moreover, we opted for a balanced setting meaning that all bidders in a group had
approximately, over the course of a session, identical average valuations and the same number
of times the highest valuation. Subjects could submit any bid between 0 and 999 ECU. Bids
did not have to be integers. In case of tied highest bids the winner was randomly selected
from these bidders.
The experiments were conducted in the experimental laboratory of the faculty of eco-
nomics and business administration at Maastricht University in March 2006. In total 108
undergraduate students participated and sessions lasted about 80 minutes. We conducted
three sessions of twelve subjects per treatment which resulted in nine independent observa-
tions per treatment. The groups were formed randomly and group members were anonymous
to each other. Subjects earned ECU during the experiment which were converted into Euros
at a known exchange rate at the end of the experiment. For S1.0, S1.5 and S2.0 the ex-
change rate for 1 ECU was respectively 2.00, 2.40 and 2.67 Eurocents. The average payoff
was e 15.60 including an initial endowment of e 5.-. None of the subjects received a negative
payoff.
The experiment was announced via email and subjects could register online using their
matriculation number. This ensured that students could participate only once. When stu-
dents arrived at the laboratory they had to draw a card from a deck that determined at
which computer terminal they were placed. In case more than twelve students showed up for
a session, we randomly determined the students that could not participate and paid them
e 3.- compensation. All interactions took place via computers that were connected to a
network and the computer terminals were placed is such a way that subjects could not see
the screens of others or make eye contact with them. The experiment was programmed in
z-Tree (Fischbacher, 1999). Before the start of a session the subjects read the instructions
and were allowed to privately ask questions which were then privately answered. After read-
ing the instructions subjects had to fill out a couple of control questions that tested their
understanding of the instructions.2 One of the experimenters checked the answers and the
experiment only started after all subjects answered each question correctly. After a session
had finished the subjects were asked to fill out a questionnaire to give the experimenters
some background information.3 Payment took place privately and subjects had to leave the
laboratory immediately once paid.
4 Hypotheses
We used the same valuations in all treatments which means that differences across treat-
ments in the first auction of a round can be purely attributed to differences in behavior. In
2See Appendix A for the instructions and control questions for the treatments S1.0 and S2.0.
3See Appendix B for this post-experiment questionnaire.
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all treatments the second auction is a simple one-shot second-price sealed-bid auction and
although the equilibrium bidding strategies are identical, comparisons across treatments are
more complicated. First of all, due to the upgrading for the winner of the first auction the
valuations are not identically distributed anymore. Second, the winner of the first auction
can have an upgraded valuation that is larger than 100. He then has the highest valuation
for sure and any bid above 100 can then be submitted if one assumes that all other subjects
are fully rational.4 These bids are then susceptible to large variations and any bid above 100
can be classified as equilibrium bidding. Since these bids can be so extreme that they heav-
ily influence aggregated group data, we will not do direct comparisons across treatments for
bidding behavior in the second auction. However these problems do not (or only marginally)
carry over to the prices and payoffs in the second auction, which therefore can be compared.
In a single second-price sealed-bid auction bidders bid truthful and the auction is therefore
efficient. From the equilibrium bidding strategies in Section 2 it can be concluded that the
presence of positive synergies does not reduce the efficiency. In the first auction of a round all
risk-neutral bidders add the same positive constant to their valuation, which means that the
bidder with the highest valuation still wins. Thus, we should not observe differences among
the efficiency in the first auction for the three treatments.
Hypothesis 1. The synergy factor has no effect on the efficiency in the first auction.
The bidding in the first auction should differ significantly across treatments, because the
presence of positive synergies leads to more aggressive bidding. In the baseline treatment
theory predicts that there is no overbidding at all, but it is a well established experimental
result that some slight overbidding is observed in second-price sealed-bid auctions (Kagel, et
al., 1987, and Kagel and Levin, 1993). According to theory a risk-neutral bidder should bid
16.67 above his valuation in treatment S1.5 and 37.50 in treatment S2.0. Hence, we expect
more overbidding the larger the synergy factor.
Hypothesis 2. The overbidding in the first auction increases in the synergy factor.
Previous theoretical and experimental research on sequential auctions with synergies only
focussed on revenue and price trends. First, we will test whether the prices in the first
auction indeed increase with the synergy factor. The difference with Hypothesis 2 is that the
price is only one of the four bids submitted in an auction.
Hypothesis 3. The price in the first auction increases in the synergy factor.
The expected prices of both auctions in a round are higher when positive synergies are present.
In the first auction all bidders bid above their valuation and in the second auction there is one
bidder that bids higher than without synergies. Consequently, the seller’s expected revenue
is larger when synergies are present and increasing in the synergy factor. This can also be
seen from the equilibrium specification in Section 2.
4See Güth et al. (2005) for an experimental analysis of an asymmetric second-price sealed-bid auction.
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Hypothesis 4. The seller’s revenue increases in the synergy factor.
Weber (1983) shows that if bidders demand a single unit, the prices in a sequential auction
of identical objects are a martingale; that is, in expectation prices drift neither up nor down.
However there is ample empirical evidence of declining price trends in sequential auctions,
which is known as the declining price anomaly or afternoon effect. For instance, declining
prices are observed in wine auctions (Ashenfelter, 1989, and McAfee and Vincent, 1993), real
estate auctions (Ashenfelter and Genesove, 1992), and impressionist and modern paintings
auctions (Beggs and Graddy, 1997). The declining price anomaly has also been found in
experimental settings (Burns, 1985, Keser and Olson, 1996, and Neugebauer and Pezanis-
Christou, 2005). Branco (1997) was the first to attribute the declining price anomaly to the
presence of positive synergies, a theoretical finding that was extended to heterogenous objects
by Jeitschko and Wolfstetter (2002).
In our setting, all bidders increase their bids in the first auction by ∆ and the expected
price then increases by this amount. In the second auction the bid of the bidder that won
the first auction increases when synergies are present and for the others it remains the same.
This will only lead to an increase in the price of the second auction in three situations.
Namely, if for the first auction winner: the upgrading increases his valuation from second
highest to highest, the upgrading increases his valuation but it remains the second highest,
or the upgrading increases his valuation from less than second highest to second highest.
Consequently, for uniformly distributed valuations declining prices will always be observed in
expectation (Leufkens et al., 2006).5
Hypothesis 5. Declining prices are observed if and only if positive synergies are present.
The uncertainty concerning the benefits from synergies leads to an exposure problem for
bidders. All bidders bid above their valuation in the first auction and it is possible that the
instantaneous payoff is negative. Although winning the first auction increases the probability
of winning the second auction, this is far from sure. The winner of the first auction may not
win the second auction or win it but still not recover the loss from the first auction and then
the total payoff from a round is negative. The probability of a negative total payoff from a
round increases with the synergy factor and theoretically this probability equals 0, 0.29 and
0.41 for respectively S1.0, S1.5 and S2.0. Thus we expect to observe negative round payoffs
more frequently the larger the upgrading is.
Hypothesis 6. The frequency with which subjects receive a negative payoff from a round
increases in the synergy factor.
5Theoretically the difference between the expected price in the first and second auction increases in the
synergy factor. A statistical analysis of this can only be done on a group level which means that opposing
trends might cancel out. Also it is not obvious whether this comparison should be done based on the absolute
or relative difference in prices. Therefore we abstain from doing such an analysis.
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Rather paradoxical, the ex-ante expected total payoff, µ̄i, is decreasing in the synergy factor.
This means that the larger the possible benefit from synergies becomes, the smaller the
expected total payoff of the bidders will be. The first auction winner pays besides the price
he would pay if it was a single auction, the difference in the expected instantaneous payoff of
the second auction between having won or lost the first auction. This means that the ex-ante
expected total payoff of the two sequential auctions equals the expected payoff of a single
auction without synergies plus the expected instantaneous payoff from the second auction
given the first auction is not won. In the experiment we should then observe that subjects
earn less ECU the larger the upgrading factor is.
Hypothesis 7. Earnings in ECU are decreasing in the synergy factor.
5 Results
In this section we present the results of our experiments. First, we discuss some descriptive
statistics of the data we collected. Since our hypotheses mainly regard the first of the two
auctions in a round, we concentrate exclusively on the overbids of the first auction for the mo-
ment. It has already been mentioned in Section 3 that we have nine independent observations
for each treatment. Four subjects formed one group and therefore we have 36 observations
for every round of a treatment. For every observation we calculate the overbid by subtracting
the bidder’s valuation from his bid. In Figure 1, we plot the first quartile, median, average,
and third quartile, of these overbids.
Figure 1: Summary statistics of overbids per round.
For S1.0 it can be observed that the first quartile and median are virtually zero in all
rounds. The average and the third quartile show some variance until round 30. In particular,
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the average lies rather often above the the third quartile which is a clear sign of outliers.
Both the average and the third quartile exhibit less variance for later rounds and converge to
values around five.
For S1.5 we observe that the first quartile is almost always zero. The median increases
slightly over the first rounds from zero to about five where it remains ever after. The average
lays always above the median (this, by the way, is true for all treatments) and above the third
quartile for some early rounds. It can also be seen that the average and the third quartile
converge to values around eight and twelve respectively.
With respect to the third treatment, S2.0, we identify some similar and some distinct
patterns. The first quartile is always close to zero and the median increases slightly in the
first rounds, something we also observed for S1.5. In contrast to that treatment, now the
average and the third quartile fluctuate extremely in the first rounds with the average being
substantially higher than the third quartile in many occasions. This is not the case anymore
in later rounds and therefore a clear sign of learning. We want to focus on mature behavior
and therefore discard the data of the first 25 rounds for all treatments for the remainder of
this paper. In all treatments behavior has settled down by then.
In the baseline treatment, subjects played a hundred independent second-price sealed-bid
auctions. Behavior in one of the groups (the first group) is very different from the other
groups. Two subjects in this group lost part of their initial endowment of e 5.- and received
e 4.80 and e 2.80 respectively. These two subjects were bidding very aggressively throughout
all auctions and their overbidding did not decrease even though they made losses. In the last
25 rounds their overbidding was very volatile and averaged 12.50 and 26.24. Furthermore,
respectively five and twelve times they received a negative payoff from an auction during the
last 50 auctions (25 rounds). The other two participants in this group played approximately
according to theory but still were not able to earn more than about e 10.-. The other eight
groups in S1.0 earned on average e 13.60 with a minimum of e 10.50 whereas this group
earned only e 6.83 on average. Although we have nine independent observations for this
treatment, tests across treatments are influenced by the behavior in this group. Since the
behavior in this group is quite anomalous compared to the other groups in this treatment, we
also discuss the results of tests from which we exclude data from the first group of S1.0.
5.1 Efficiency
Although the presence of positive synergies changes the equilibrium bidding strategy, it should
not influence the efficiency of the first auction of a round. All risk-neutral bidders add the
same positive constant to their bid and hence the bidder with the highest valuation still wins.
To see whether this indeed holds true for our experiment we compare both the efficiency and
the number of times the auction is completely efficient across treatments.
We measure the efficiency in the conventional way, namely as the winner’s valuation
divided by the highest valuation a subject had. This measure itself is not interesting, since
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it is responsive to the scale from which the valuations are drawn, but comparing the values
across treatments can be informative.6 We also report the relative occurrence of a completely
efficient auction. Although this measure is not that commonly used and insensitive to the
degree of inefficiency, it is not responsive to scale and therefore straightforward to interpret.
S1.0 S1.5 S2.0
Efficiency 99.62 97.72 97.30
Occurrence 92.44 84.44 77.78
S1.0 0.073 0.000
S1.5 0.073 0.136
S2.0 0.000 0.136
Table 1: The efficiency and occurrence of an efficient auction in percentages. The two-sided Mann-
Whitney U statistics are based on the average efficiency in a group.
As can be seen in the upper row of Table 1, the average efficiency in S1.0 is higher than
in the treatments with synergies. The same is observed for the instances in which the auction
is efficient and both measures of efficiency are lower the larger the upgrading is. The second
part of the table contains the significance levels of a two-sided Mann-Whitney U test across
treatments based on the average efficiency in a group. The efficiency in the first group of S1.0
is much lower than in the other groups and excluding this group decreases the significance
of a comparison between S1.0 and S1.5 to 0.037. Thus although the difference between S1.0
and S1.5 is not significant at 5 percent when we include all groups, it is still reasonable
to conclude that the efficiency in the two treatments with positive synergies is significantly
different (lower) from that in the baseline treatment. It cannot be concluded that there is
a significant difference between the efficiency in S1.5 and S2.0. Tests on the occurrence of a
completely efficient auction support these insights.
Result 1. The presence of positive synergies reduces the efficiency in the first auction.
5.2 Aggressive bidding
The larger the expected benefit from upgrading, the more aggressive the bidding in the first
auction should be. Therefore we expect the overbidding to be significantly higher, the larger
the upgrading is. In the first part of Table 2 we report the overall average and median overbid
per treatment. Although in the two treatments with positive synergies the overbidding is much
lower than theory predicts, we do see that it increases with the synergy factor.
In the second part of the table we report the significance levels of a one-sided Mann-
Whitney U test across treatments which is based on the average overbid per group. It can be
concluded that at a 5 percent significance level, the overbidding indeed increases significantly
with the synergy factor. Excluding the first group of S1.0 leads to even higher significance
6See Ledyard et al. (1989) for a discussion on this.
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S1.0 S1.5 S2.0
Average 4.23 8.12 12.16
Median 0.00 4.30 7.00
S1.0 0.020 0.001
S1.5 0.020 0.047
S2.0 0.001 0.047
Table 2: The average and median overbidding per treatment. The one-sided Mann-Whitney U statis-
tics are based on the average overbidding per group.
levels for comparisons between this treatment and the other two. When we do the same
analysis but then on the median overbid per group, the difference between S1.5 and S2.0 is
not significant at any conventional level. Thus, although the average overbidding increases
significantly with the synergy factor we do not find the same for the median overbidding.
Result 2. The larger the synergy factor, the more aggressive the average bidding in the first
auction. Also the median bidding gets more aggressive when positive synergies are present,
but there is no significant difference for the different synergy factors.
5.3 Prices and revenues
We will now analyze the effect the presence of synergies has on prices and revenue. In the first
row of Table 3 it can be seen that the overall average and median price in the first auction
increases with the synergy factor. However it can also be seen that the difference between
S2.0 and S1.5 is smaller than between S1.5 and S1.0.
S1.0 S1.5 S2.0
Average 65.24 71.07 75.39
Median 68.00 73.00 78.00
S1.0 0.004 0.000
S1.5 0.004 0.129
S2.0 0.000 0.129
Table 3: The average and median price per treatment. The one-sided Mann-Whitney U statistics are
based on the average prices per group.
The second part of Table 3 reports the significance levels of one-sided Mann-Whitney U
tests across treatments. The tests are based on the average price per group and basing the
tests on the median price per group leads to similar results. Indeed the average prices in
the two treatments with positive synergies are significantly larger than in S1.0. The average
prices in S1.5 and S2.0 do not differ significantly.
Result 3. The presence of synergies leads to a higher price in the first auction of a round.
However, the price does not increase significantly when the synergy factor increases further.
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Revenues are always important for a seller. According to theory, the seller is the only person
who benefits from the presence of synergies. For the moment we will only analyze whether
the seller benefits from the synergies the bidders had. In the next subsection we will discuss
the payoffs for the subjects.
S1.0 S1.5 S2.0
Average 128.03 140.24 149.01
Median 129.00 141.00 149.00
S1.0 0.001 0.000
S1.5 0.001 0.082
S2.0 0.000 0.082
Table 4: The average and median revenue in ECU per treatment. The one-sided Mann-Whitney U
statistics are based on the average revenue per group.
Although we saw that the difference between the prices in the first auction was not sig-
nificant between S2.0 and S1.5, the difference in revenue from both auctions within a round
might still be. The overall average and median revenue indeed increase with the synergy
factor but again the difference between S2.0 and S1.5 is smaller than between S1.5 and S1.0.
In the second part of Table 4 we observe similar results as for the price in the first auction.
There is a significant difference between the revenue from S1.0 and the two treatments with
synergies. The difference between S2.0 and S1.5 is not significant at 5 percent. Again the
presence of synergies leads to a significant change, but the revenue is not as responsive to a
further increase in the synergy factor as predicted by theory. Basing the statistical analysis
on the median price per group leads to similar results.
Result 4. The presence of synergies leads to a higher revenue from a round. However, the
revenue does not increase significantly when the synergy factor increases further.
Although the declining price anomaly is always observed in expectation for uniformly dis-
tributed valuations, it depends on the drawn valuations whether it is actually observed in a
round. To see whether prices are actually declining we run a Wilcoxon signed ranks test on
the prices in the first and second auction in each round per group. Keser and Olson (1996)
mention that a simple comparison of the observations in which prices decline and increase
is not correct since the price distributions of the units are not symmetric for homogeneous
objects. We have heterogeneous objects where the valuations were drawn anew for each auc-
tion and therefore do not have this complication. In S1.0 there should be no price trend and
therefore the tests are two-sided. In the treatments with positive synergies, declining prices
should be observed and the reported test statistics are one-sided. Given the realizations of
the valuations, prices should be significantly declining in both S1.5 and S2.0.
As can be seen in Table 5, for S1.0 there is no group for which we can reject that the
prices in both auctions are equal. For the two treatments with positive synergies the equality
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Group S1.0 S1.5 S2.0
1 0.797 0.467 0.043
2 0.578 0.329 0.278
3 0.921 0.336 0.265
4 0.658 0.409 0.146
5 0.556 0.044 0.497
6 0.806 0.492 0.174
7 0.329 0.497 0.455
8 0.679 0.088 0.248
9 0.679 0.282 0.398
Table 5: Wilcoxon signed ranks test on the prices in the first and second auction per group. For S1.0
the tests are two-sided and for S1.5 and S2.0 the tests are one-sided.
of prices can also not be rejected for almost all groups. For both S1.5 and S2.0 prices are
significantly declining in only a single group. Additionally, in S2.0 even at 10 percent we can
reject the equality of prices for only one group.
Result 5. We do not observe declining prices when synergies are present.
5.4 Payoffs
According to theory the presence of positive synergies is not beneficial for bidders. First of
all, bidders receive a negative payoff from a round with positive probability. Second, the
expected payoff from a round is lower with than without synergies. In this subsection we will
examine subjects’ payoffs for both effects.
For each group we calculated the number of times a subject received a negative round
payoff that was caused by the first auction of a round. Thus, to count as a round bankruptcy
both the first auction and the round payoff had to be negative. This measure excludes
negative round payoffs that were caused by the second auction, which are not stemming from
the presence of synergies but due to standard overbidding. However, doing the analysis on
all negative round payoffs leads to the same insights.
S1.0 S1.5 S2.0
Average 2.67 4.89 5.33
Median 2.00 5.00 5.00
S1.0 0.073 0.008
S1.5 0.073 0.441
S2.0 0.008 0.441
Table 6: The average and median number of round bankruptcies per treatment. The exact one-sided
Mann-Whitney U statistics are based on the number of round bankruptcies per group.
Given the theoretical probability with which the first auction winner receives a negative
payoff from a round, we should observe approximately 0, 7 and 10 round bankruptcies for
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respectively S1.0, S1.5 and S2.0. In Table 6 it can be seen that the average number of round
bankruptcies for the baseline treatment is larger and for the two treatments with synergies is
smaller than theory predicts. The average number of round bankruptcies increases with the
synergy factor, but the median is identical for S1.5 and S2.0.
In Table 6 we also report the one-sided Mann-Whitney U statistics which are based on
the number of round bankruptcies per group. When we exclude the first group of S1.0, which
has eight round bankruptcies in the last 25 rounds according to the criterium used here, the
average number of observed bankruptcies drops to 2. In Table 6 the difference between S1.0
and S1.5 is not significant at 5 percent but without this first group the significance level drops
to 0.022. The difference between S1.0 and S2.0 is always significant. Therefore we conclude
that the number of round bankruptcies increases significantly when synergies are present.
We cannot conclude that the number of round bankruptcies increases significantly when the
synergy factor increases from 1.5 to 2.0.
Result 6. The presence of positive synergies leads to significantly more round bankruptcies.
However, the frequency with which round bankruptcies are observed is not as responsive to the
synergy factor as predicted by theory.
So far we have observed that although the presence of positive synergies changes the sequen-
tial auction fundamentally, subjects’ behavior does not differ significantly between the two
treatments with positive synergies. Although the average overbidding in S2.0 is significantly
larger than in S1.5, we cannot find significant differences in the median overbidding, first
auction prices, seller’s revenue and number of bankruptcies. The bidding does not get as
aggressive as predicted by theory and this could be caused by the amount of bankruptcies
experienced in the first 25 rounds. However, we do not find such a negative relation between
overbidding in the last 25 rounds and the number of experienced (round) bankruptcies in the
first 25 rounds. The modest increase in competitiveness in the synergy factor can thus not
be attributed to an idiosyncratic response to experienced bankruptcy.
According to theory the expected payoff from a round decreases with the synergy factor
because the bidding in the first auction gets more aggressive. The above results then suggest
that lower payoffs might not be observed here because the bidding does not get sufficiently
aggressive.
S1.0 S1.5 S2.0
Average 227.49 247.54 322.69
Median 235.15 251.00 332.45
S1.0 0.193 0.001
S1.5 0.193 0.004
S2.0 0.001 0.004
Table 7: The average and median payment in ECU per treatment. The one-sided Mann-Whitney U
statistics are based on the average payment per group.
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The upper part of Table 7 shows that the average and median payment to subjects is
increasing in the synergy factor. In the second part of the table we report the significance
levels of a one-sided Mann-Whitney U test across treatments which is based on the average
payment per group. The difference between S1.0 and S1.5 is not significant and the payment
in S2.0 is significantly larger than in both. Of course, the extremely low earnings in the first
group of S1.0 (125.00 on average) influences the test results. The average payment in S1.0
without this group increases to 240.31 and the significance levels of a comparison with S1.5
and S2.0 are 0.303 and 0.003 respectively.
Due to the synergies, the surplus to be divided in S1.5 is larger than in S1.0. However
subjects do not significantly earn more, since the increase in total surplus is dissipated by
the more aggressive bidding. An increase in the synergy factor increases the surplus to be
divided further, but does not increase the price significantly (Result 3) and thus the payoffs
bidders receive increase.
Result 7. There is no significant difference between the earnings in S1.0 and S1.5. The
earnings in S2.0 are significantly larger than in the other two treatments.
6 Behavioral aspects
In the previous section the tests were based on group data. In this section we analyze subjects’
behavior on an individual level. People rely on a limited number of heuristic principles that
reduce the complexity of tasks. Although these heuristics are quite useful, they sometimes
lead to systematic errors, because a slight change in the presentation of a problem can have
a significant effect on the experimental outcome (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). We first
analyze whether there is a difference between the behavior in the first and second auction in
S1.0. Then we test whether there is a relationship between the valuation and the overbid in
the first auction of a round for each treatment.
In S1.0 one hundred independent second-price sealed-bid auctions are grouped into fifty
rounds of two auctions each. We will now examine whether this presentation induces differ-
ences in behavior in both auctions in the last twenty-five rounds. Although it is not rational,
subjects might bid less aggressive in the first auction since they have two chances to win in
a round.
Auction 1 Auction 2
Average 4.23 4.58
Median 0.00 0.00
bi > vi 49 % 48 %
bi = vi 47 % 47 %
bi < vi 4 % 5 %
Table 8: The average and median overbid and the bidding behavior compared to theory for the first
and second auction in S1.0.
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In Table 8 it can be seen that the median overbids are equal and that the average overbid
in the second auction is slightly higher than in the first auction. The percentages of truthful
bids are equal and in the first auction there are more overbids than in the second auction.
To test whether there is a significant difference in bidding behavior we do a Wilcoxon signed
ranks test on the overbids in both auctions for each individual. At a significance level of
5 percent the null hypothesis can be rejected for only 1 out of 36 subjects. Also at 10%
significance level we do not find more significant differences. Thus we do not find that the
presentation of two auctions in a sequence per round leads to differences in behavior between
both auctions.
Kagel and Levin (1993) find that in an experiment with five bidders 62 percent of all bids
are above and 8 percent are below valuation. In Table 8 it can be seen that we observe much
more bidding according to theory and less overbidding. However, we have many repetitions
of the auction and only discuss mature behavior, whereas their frequencies include all ob-
servations. Also, we have four rather than five bidders in a group which might cause faster
learning. Finally, 18 out of 36 subjects indicated to have come across at least some auction
theory during their studies.
Result 8. We do not find framing effects in the baseline treatment.
Our final analysis concerns the relationship between the overbidding and valuation in the first
auction. For the two treatments with positive synergies the overbidding in the first auction,
which is the expected increase in the second auction payoff from winning the first, is based
on the expected second auction valuations. The valuation in the first auction is uncorrelated
to the valuation that will be drawn in the second auction. Consequently, the amount of
overbidding should be completely independent of the first auction valuation.
To analyze the relationship between the amount of overbidding and the valuation in the
first auction, we regress the overbid on the valuation for all observations in the last 25 rounds
for each treatment. To correct for heterogeneity between groups we include a dummy for each
group in the regression. Dependency within a group is corrected for by clustering observations
from the same group. We include lagged overbids to take out dependency over rounds and
also correct for heteroscedasticity. Any of the above independent variables is removed from
the estimation if its significance is less than 5 percent. The estimation results can be seen in
Table 9.
For S1.0 the intercept is not significantly different from zero, but for groups 1 and 3 the
dummies are well above zero and significant. The coefficient of valuation is insignificant at 5
percent. When we exclude group 1, where the overbidding is much higher for high valuations
than for low, the coefficient of valuation is also insignificant at 10 percent. Thus, the drawn
valuation does not explain the overbidding in the baseline treatment. The regression for the
second auction of a round in S1.0 leads to the same insights.
For S1.5 the constant is not significant, but the two lags of overbid capture the level
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Treatment Variable Coefficient Std. Error t P > |t|
S1.0 Constant −1.656 2.087 −0.79 0.450
Group 1 7.757 0.523 14.84 0.000
Group 3 7.767 0.523 14.86 0.000
Valuation 0.082 0.041 2.01 0.080
Adjusted R2 = 0.061
S1.5 Constant −0.452 0.692 −0.65 0.532
Lag 1 0.430 0.087 4.96 0.001
Lag 2 7.767 0.099 3.64 0.007
Valuation 0.041 0.015 2.78 0.024
Adjusted R2 = 0.550
S2.0 Constant −4.703 1.792 −2.62 0.030
Group 7 −2.085 0.613 −3.40 0.009
Lag 1 0.140 0.034 4.09 0.003
Lag 2 0.415 0.044 9.34 0.000
Lag 3 0.197 0.013 15.13 0.000
Valuation 0.157 0.048 3.24 0.012
Adjusted R2 = 0.492
Table 9: The estimation results with overbid as dependent variable for each treatment.
of constant overbidding. Although the coefficient of valuation is small, it is positive and
significantly different from zero. For S2.0 we have to include a dummy for group 7 and
three lags. Although the constant is negative and significant, it is impossible to give an
interpretation for this due to the lags. The coefficient of valuation is large and significant. A
subject with a valuation of 100 overbids 15.54 more than a subject with a valuation of 1. It
is also noteworthy that the adjusted R2 is much higher for the two treatments with synergies
than for S1.0.
Result 9. When positive synergies are present, subject’s overbidding in the first auction
increases with the valuation. This effect is especially pronounced for S2.0.
People often estimate a probability or valuation by adjusting an initial value. This initial
value, an anchor, can be an arbitrary number that is suggested by the formulation of the
problem or is a straightforward reference point. Typically, the adjustment is insufficient and
therefore different anchors yield different estimates. The dependency of the estimate on the
initial value is called anchoring (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974).
The observed positive relationship between the overbid and valuation in S1.5 and S2.0
and the lack of such a relationship in S1.0 can be explained by anchoring. When subjects
estimate their second auction valuation by taking the first auction valuation as reference point
(anchor), the expected valuation for the second auction will increase with the valuation in the
first auction.7 The higher the valuation of the second object, the larger the expected benefit
7Usually the term anchoring is used when the value of a completely distinct variable has an effect on the
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from synergies. Anchoring then leads to more overbidding in the first auction when the first
auction valuation is high than when it is low.
If anchoring is indeed the explanation for the observed relationship between overbidding
and valuation, we should not observe such a relationship for S1.0 and the second auctions in
S1.5 and S2.0. The estimation results for the second auction of S1.0 are similar to those for
the first, which are reported in Table 9, and thus do not display any significant relationship
between the overbid and valuation. A regression on the overbids in the second auction of
a round for the two treatments with positive synergies is not feasible due to the upgraded
valuations that are above 100. Any bid above 100 is then consistent with theory and the
enormous variability of these bids influences a regression with all observations substantially.
Excluding valuations above 100 skews the results because we then remove 151 observations
above 66.67 for S1.5 and 242 observations above 50.00 for S2.0. Still, comparing the estimation
results for the first auction for the two treatments with positive synergies to those for the
baseline treatment shows that our results are consistent with anchoring.
A comment concerning the regressions is that bids had to be nonnegative. Underbidding
is then much more restricted at low valuations than at high valuations. However, the number
of observations in which the overbid is negative is small for each treatment. The fraction of
overbids that is smaller than −2 is negligible and caused by a small group of subjects. The
upper bound on bidding was that high that no overbid came even close to it and therefore
also did not influence our results. Finally, all subjects filled out control questions before the
experiment started and one of the questions explicitly tested whether subjects understood
that there was no relationship between the valuation drawn for the first auction and the
valuation drawn for the second auction. Therefore the results cannot be attributed to a
misunderstanding of the relationship between the drawn valuations in both auctions.
Although we think that the increase in overbid can be attributed to anchoring, it cannot
be neglected that risk behavior or loss aversion may play a role. Namely, it is under risk
neutrality that theory predicts the overbid to be independent of the value. However, if we
assume bidders to be risk averse, a win in the second auction becomes less important for the
first auction winner relative to the first auction losers. Therefore, the option value effect of
winning in the first auction seems to be decreasing in the level of aversion towards risk. In
addition, the option value of winning is expected to be decreasing in the expected payoff for
the first auction, which is in turn positively related to the valuation drawn for the first auction.
Hence, it is more likely to expect that the overbid is decreasing in the valuation than it to be
increasing in the valuation. In order to guarantee ex ante efficiency—that is, the bidder with
the highest valuation in the first auction to win the first auction—the overbid should then
be constant. Efficiency is expected to be satisfied in equilibrium, since the second auction
valuations are independent from the first auction valuations. All in all, we do not think risk
estimation of a variable of interest. Although here the two variables of interest are both valuations, we would
still like to call this anchoring, since the valuations are completely uncorrelated.
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aversion explains the increase in overbid. Regarding loss aversion, although theoretically we
are not able to rule out a dependency of the overbid on the valuation, experimentally we
did not find a negative relation between overbidding in the last 25 rounds and the number
of experienced (round) bankruptcies in the first 25 rounds. This makes it unlikely that the
observed value-dependent overbidding can be attributed to loss aversion.
7 Conclusion
Many auction settings can be characterized as being sequential in nature and synergies are
often present. Most theoretical and experimental research so far only discussed revenues and
price trends. However, theoretically it can be shown that in the setting considered here, the
presence of positive synergies can have counter-intuitive consequences for bidders. Namely,
the presence of synergies leads to more aggressive bidding which makes subjects lose not
only all benefits from synergies but also part of their payoff without synergies. This can
even result in bankruptcies. To see whether all these gloomy theoretical predictions will
indeed be observed we conducted an experimental analysis. The experimental results can
give interesting insights for government procurement and other sequential auction settings.
We find that the presence of positive synergies indeed changes the auction fundamentally.
But, the consequences of the synergies are not as bleach as predicted by theory. The efficiency
is lower when synergies are present and the average overbidding increases with the size of
the synergy factor. The latter leads to an increase in the number of bankruptcies that are
observed. However, bidding does not get as aggressive as predicted by theory. Especially the
responsiveness to an increase in the size of the synergy factor is much smaller than predicted.
Consequently we find that bidders do benefit from synergies. The seller benefits from the
synergies but not as much as expected. With respect to price trends we find that the price
in the first auction of a round does not increase enough to observe declining prices.
The experimental results can also be analyzed for biases in subjects’ behavior. The pre-
sentation of grouping a hundred independent second-price sealed-bid auctions into rounds of
two auctions each in the baseline treatment does not lead to differences between behavior in
the first and second auction of a round. The valuations in both auctions of a round are drawn
completely independently, but anchoring will make subjects with a high valuation in the first
auction expect a high valuation in the second auction. Expecting a higher second auction
valuation will lead to more overbidding in the first auction. Indeed a positive relationship
is found between the first auction valuation and the first auction overbid. Especially for the
treatment with large synergies this effect is prominent.
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Appendix
A Experimental instructions
Here we will give the instructions for the baseline treatment and the treatment with synergy
factor 2.0. When there is difference between the instructions, the instructions for S1.0 will be
written between { } and the instructions for S2.0 treatment will be written between [ ].
Dear participant,
thank you for taking part in this experiment.
This experiment will last about 1.5 hours and you will be compensated according to your
performance. In order to ensure that the experiment takes place in an optimal setting, we
would like to ask you to follow the general rules during the whole experiment:
• Do not communicate with your fellow students! Even though the experiment may get
exiting at times, it is very important that you remain silent through the proceedings.
• Please, switch off your mobile phone!
• Please read the instructions carefully! It is important that you understand the rules of
the experiment. The instructions are identical for all participants. If something is not
explained well, please raise your hand. Do not ask the question out loud, but wait until
one of the experimenters approaches you to answer the question privately.
• You may make notes on the instruction sheets.
• After the experiment please remain seated until you are paid off.
• If you do not obey to the rules, the data becomes useless for us. Therefore we will have
to exclude you from this experiment and you will not receive any compensation.
Your decisions are anonymous. Neither your fellow students nor anybody else will ever learn
them from us.
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General set-up In this experiment all of you are buyers of a fictitious object that is auc-
tioned off. You can earn ECUs (Experimental Currency Unit) which will be exchanged into
Euros at the end of the experiment. The exchange rates will be given in the instructions
below.
If you win an auction you do not receive the object but you receive an amount of money
equal to your value of the object v which is expressed in ECUs. In return you have to pay
the price p resulting from the auction. Thus you receive a payoff of v− p ECUs. The rules of
the auction will be discussed below.
Before the experiment starts, you will be randomly divided into groups of 4 potential buy-
ers. You will not know the 3 potentials buyers you are matched with. The groups remain
unchanged throughout the whole experiment.
This experiment consists of 50 rounds. Each round consists of 2 auctions which are held after
each other. Now we will explain the procedures in each round.
Auction rules In each auction you and the 3 other potential buyers in your group will be
bidding for a single object that is auctioned off.
In each auction the following happens. First you observe your value of the object. Then all
of you are asked to submit a bid. Your bid can be any nonnegative number.
Within each group, the winner is the subject who submitted the highest bid. In case the
highest bid was submitted by more than one subject, the computer will randomly select a
winner among those subjects. The price the winner has to pay will be the highest bid among
the subjects that did not win the object. The payoff to the winner will be the difference
between his value v and the price he has to pay p. All other subjects get a payoff of 0.
Auction 1 The proceedings in the first auction of each round are as follows.
First your value of the object will be determined. For each subject this value will be an
independently drawn integer between 0 and 100 with each number being equally likely. Your
value will only be known to you.
After observing your value all of you are asked to submit a bid. Thus you will submit this bid
after observing your value of the object but without observing the values or bids of the other
subjects. To submit a bid you can fill in the number in the box and click on submit. Notice
that your bid is not restricted to the interval [0,100], thus bids higher than 100 are allowed.
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Figure 1: illustration of bidding in auction 1. Your value in the first auction is v1. To make a bid you can
enter a number in the corresponding box and click on submit. The screen also shows that this is the first out
of 50 rounds and that your total payoff of all previous rounds is 0.0.
[ The meaning of the sentence ‘If you win this auction, your value of the object in the second
auction will be upgraded by factor 2.0 ’ will be clarified below. ]
After all of you submitted a bid, the winner and the price will be determined according to
the rules mentioned above. The following feedback on the result of the auction will appear
on your screen. Click on continue when you are ready for the second auction of this round.
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Figure 2: illustration of the results of auction 1. Your value was v1 and your bid was b1. You won the auction
and the price you have to pay is equal to p1. Consequently your payoff from the first auction in this round is
v1 − p1.
Auction 2 The proceedings in the second auction of each round are as follows.
A new value of the object will be determined for each subject and this will again be an
independently drawn integer between 0 and 100. Again each number is equally likely and
your value will only be known to you.
[ In each group, the new value of the subject that won the first auction will be upgraded by
factor 2.0. Thus the actual value for the subject that won the first auction will be a number
between 0 and 200. The new values of the three other subjects will not be upgraded. Your
screen will list both your value and your possibly upgraded value. ]
After observing your [upgraded] value all of you are asked to submit a bid. Again notice that
your bid is not restricted to the interval [0,100].
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Figure 3: illustration of bidding in auction 2.
{ Your value in the second auction is v2. To make a bid you can enter a number in the corresponding box and
click on submit. }
[ Since you won the first auction, your drawn value v2 is upgraded by factor 2.0. Hence your upgraded value
is 2.0 times v2. For the three subjects that did not win the first auction, their upgraded value will be equal to
their value. To make a bid you can enter a number in the corresponding box and click on submit. ]
After all of you submitted a bid, the winner and the price will be determined according to
the rules mentioned above. The following feedback on the result of the auction will appear
on your screen.
27
Figure 4: illustration of the results of auction 2. Your value was v2
[ and since you won the first auction your upgraded value was 2.0 ∗ v2. ]
Your bid was b2 and you did not win the auction. Consequently your payoff from the second auction in this
round is zero. Your payoff from the round is the sum of the payoffs of both auctions and thus in this case
v1 − p1. This was the first round and therefore the total payoff in the upper right corner changes from 0.0 into
v1 − p1.
This ends the round and the first auction of a new round starts after all of you clicked Con-
tinue. In total you will participate in 50 rounds of 2 auctions each.
After the last round of the experiment, we would like to ask you to complete a short ques-
tionnaire that will appear on your screen. Payments will be made by the experimenters
afterwards.
ECUs are transformed into Euros according to the following conversion rate:
{ 1 ECU = 0.02 Euro. You will get an initial budget of 5 Euro (250 ECU). }
[ 1 ECU = 0.026 Euro. You will get an initial budget of 5 Euro (187.50 ECU). ]
Note that this initial budget is not taken into account in the total payoff reported on your
screen. If you make losses in an auction these will be deducted from the sum of
your previous gains and the initial budget. Note that if the losses exceed previous
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gains and your initial budget, we will ask you to pay the difference. You will receive
your final payment, thus the initial budget plus or minus your total payoff, in cash at the end
of the experiment.
Before we start with the experiment we would like you to answer the questions on the next
page. One of the experimenters will go around and check the answers and discuss any prob-
lems.
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Control questions
The questions between [ ] were only used in treatments S1.5 and S2.0.
Please answer the following questions. When you are finished, please raise your hand. One
of the experimenters will come to you and check whether everything is correct.
1.) Suppose you have a value of 86 for the object. What can you conclude about the values
of the three other potential buyers?
Their value is also 86.
Their value might be 86 and might be different from that.
Their value is different in any case.
2.) Suppose the four participants A, B, C, D submitted the following bids: A submitted
46, B submitted 93, C submitted 74, and D submitted 7. Who wins the auction?
A B C D
3.) What price does this subject have to pay?
46 93 74 7
4.) Suppose you have a value of 45 in the first auction. What can you conclude about your
value in the second auction before upgrading?
The value will also be 45.
The value might be 45 and might be different from that.
The value is different in any case.
[ 5.) Suppose you did not win the first auction and your drawn value in the second auction
is 80. What is your upgraded value?
6.) Suppose you won the first auction and your drawn value in the second auction is 80.
What is your upgraded value?
]
7.) Suppose you buy the object for a price of 56. Your value of the object is 65. What is
your payoff from this auction?
8.) Suppose you buy the object for a price of 31. Your value of the object is 24. What is
your payoff from this auction?
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B Post-experiment questionnaire
Here we will give the questionnaire that subjects filled out after the experiment had finished.
The question between [ ] was only used in treatments S1.5 and S2.0.
Subject ID (see the number on your computer):
Year of birth:
Gender:
Nationality:
Study:
Did you ever deal with auctions in one of your courses?
◦ yes, thoroughly
◦ yes, but superficially
◦ never
Do or did you participate in online auctions (e.g. www.ebay.com)?
◦ frequently
◦ sometimes
◦ never
Did you participate in other auction experiments?
◦ more than once
◦ once
◦ never
Do or did you ever participate in auctions that are not an experiment or conducted online?
◦ frequently
◦ sometimes
◦ never
[ With regards to the upgrading factor, would you have preferred:
◦ no upgrading
◦ a smaller upgrading factor
◦ no change in the upgrading factor
◦ a larger upgrading factor ]
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